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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper I critically investigate the conceptions of moral evil defended by Morton 
and Card. In the light of this investigation, I present and briefly defend the following 
conception of evil: An evil act is one in which the perpetrator acts in a way which, 
through a consideration of their circumstances, motives, intentions, responses and the 
like, we judge to go significantly beyond the pale of mere wrongdoing and so to be worthy 
of our very strongest moral condemnations, and who in so acting wrongfully inflicts life-
wrecking or ending harms upon others. 
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BARRIERS TO EVIL 
 
Traditionally all of life’s ‘minuses’ have been lumped together under the rubric of evil. In its broadest sense evil 
can cover ‘everything adverse in human lives’ from ‘wars and massacres’ to ‘drought and plague.’i This is the 
axiological sense of evil, and it is in this sense that evil takes on its familiar role as the opposite or lack of good. 
Here the terms evil and bad are essentially equivalent. However, we use evil not only in an axiological sense, 
but also in a moral sense. ii We use evil in a moral sense when we refer to those acts of moral agents that are 
beyond the pale of mere wrongdoing. For example, what Hitler did was not merely wrong, it was evil, whereas 
failing to keep a promise may be wrong, but it certainly isn’t evil. Evil acts are those acts that go significantly 
beyond the pale of mere wrongdoing, and for that reason, we judge them to be worthy of our very strongest 
moral condemnations.  
 
It follows from this that all moral evils are wrong, but not all moral wrongs are evil. Thus the purpose of a 
conception of evil is to separate out moral evil from the merely wrong. There are three ways that this can be 
done – either it is something about the perpetrator, such as their motive, or the victim, such as the amount of 
suffering they endure, or both, that makes an act not merely wrong, but evil. There has been a number of recent 
attempts to provide a conception of evil, however, I focus here only on Morton iii and Card iv – but see also 
Corlett v, Cushman vi, Formosa vii, Garrard viii, Kekes ix, Midgley x, Singer  xi, and Vetlesen xii. Morton xiii has 
recently argued for the following conception of evil: 
 
A person’s act is evil when it results from a strategy or learned procedure which allows that 
person’s deliberations over the choice of actions not to be inhibited by barriers against 
considering harm or humiliating others that ought to have been in place. 
 
On Morton’s conception of evil it is primarily something about the perpetrator, in particular the nature of their 
deliberations, that makes an act not only wrong, but evil. On this conception, if I commit a murder because 
someone makes me very angry, then that act is not evil, though presumably still wrong. In contrast, if I have a 
strategy or learned procedure for overcoming my barrier against doing violence, and I use that procedure to 
bring myself to commit murder, then my act is not only wrong, but evil. 
 
Morton xiv claims, drawing on Robert Blair’s work on VIM (violence inhibiting mechanisms), that we are all 
subject to an innate biological barrier against violently doing harm to others. However, we all have a threshold 
limit at which we naturally overcome this barrier and pass from a peaceful to a violent mode. Of course, we all 
have different limits to which we can be pushed, but if pushed hard and long enough, there comes a time when 
we will all react, potentially violently. For some the provocation that will elicit violence needs to be very small, 
for others very large. We become violent and aggressive, however, not only as a natural response to 
provocation, but also unnaturally, as a result of learned procedures. The sort of learned procedures that Morton 
has in mind include things like: learning to become violent in order to get what one wants, and acquiring racist 
beliefs that make it easy to inflict violence against those considered racially inferior.  
 
When we overcome a barrier against harming and humiliating others that ought to be in place, as a result of a 
learned procedure, then according to Morton that act is evil, even if the harm or humiliation inflicted is minimal. 
But which set of barriers ought to be in place? This set cannot simply be those barriers (if any) that are 
biologically innate to our species, because “many of the barriers that ought to be in place are learned” xv. As 
such, given that at least some barriers that ought to be in place must be learned, it follows that it is possible 
(even likely) that some of those barriers that ought to be in place may not in fact be in place.    
 
This leads to the following problem. Take the example of Hannibal, who has never learned to erect barriers 
against harming others. Further, Hannibal is a sociopath and, as such, is not subject to innate biological barriers 
against harming others. Not surprisingly, Hannibal comes to inflict much gratuitous harm upon others. Indeed, 
Hannibal tortures and kills scores of people, and he even comes to enjoy harming others for its own sake. But 
Hannibal’s acts can never count as evil on Morton’s conception, because Hannibal’s acts do not result from a 
learned procedure for overcoming barriers against harming and humiliating others that ought to be in place. 
Hannibal did not need to overcome such barriers for the simple reason that no such barriers where there in the 
first place, and thus no method was needed for overcoming them. This implies that someone, like Hannibal, who 
acts in violation of barriers that ought to be in place, but where those barriers are not in fact in place, can 
literally do no evil. This is deeply counter-intuitive. Thus if we wish to judge the acts of sociopaths like 
Hannibal to be evil, as Morton xvi rightly seems to, then we must reject Morton’s conception of evil. 
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Another example will further illustrate the problems with Morton’s conception of evil. Take the example of 
Mary, who has a barrier against stealing, but who learns to overcome that barrier by telling herself that the shop 
she is stealing from is owned by a very rich person who won’t miss what she takes. Mary’s act of stealing, as it 
results from a learned procedure for overcoming a barrier against doing harm to others that ought to be in place, 
counts as evil on Morton’s conception. But surely we would not want to say that Mary performs an evil act by 
stealing in this way, even if she does wrong. 
 
Morton conception of evil, as the examples of Hannibal and Mary illustrate, suffers from two sorts of problems - 
sometimes we judge an act to be evil even when no learned procedures are in play, as in the case of Hannibal, 
and sometimes we judge an act not to be evil because the harms inflicted are minor, even when learned 
procedures are in play, as in the case of Mary. While the first of these problems is specific to Morton’s 
conception of evil, the second is endemic to all conceptualisations of evil that focus solely on the perpetrator’s 
psychology or process of deliberation. Such approaches tend to focus too much on the perpetrator of evil and not 
enough on the victims. This can potentially have the, at times, counter-intuitive consequence that wrongs with 
trivial outcomes are considered evil, while wrongs with enormously harmful and humiliating outcomes are not 
considered evil.  
 
In contrast to Morton, Cardxvii offers a conception of evil that focuses on the harm done to victims, rather than 
the perpetrator’s psychology or process of deliberation. For Card an evil act is any act whereby an ‘intolerable 
harm’ is ‘brought about, seriously risked, sustained, aggravated, or tolerated by culpable wrongdoing’xviii. On 
this conception it is something solely about the victim of a wrongful act that makes that act not merely wrong, 
but evil. On Card’s conception, no matter how or why someone wrongly inflicts an intolerable harm on others, 
that act is evil. 
 
However, Card’s conception of evil suffers from the following problem. Take the example of John, who 
normally never drinks, but on hearing of the death of his closest friend, goes out and gets drunk. John decides to 
drive home while grossly intoxicated. Tragically, his erratic driving causes another car to swerve and crash into 
a tree, killing the family of five inside. John acts wrongly by driving while intoxicated, and his actions brought 
about the deaths of five people, including three children. But is John’s act evil? Morton would certainly not 
think so. John’s act was a one-off, brought on by despair, which did not result from a learned procure for 
overcoming barriers that ought to be in place. But Card’s conception of evil commits her to calling John’s act 
evil. Indeed, any wrongful act that inflicts (or even only seriously risks, sustains, aggravates, or tolerates) much 
harm, no matter what the circumstances, is automatically to be conceived of as evil on Card’s conception. But 
this seems deeply counter-intuitive in cases like John’s. 
 
The failures of Morton’s conception of evil suggest that evil acts are distinct from wrongs acts on the grounds 
that the former necessarily inflict significant amounts of harm. The failures of Card’s conception of evil, in 
contrast, suggests that it cannot be only the infliction of enormous and serious amounts of harm that makes evil 
acts distinct from wrong acts. From this it follows that an evil act is to be distinguished from a merely wrong act 
by something about both the harm inflicted upon the victim of that act, and some relevant facts about the 
perpetrator of that act. In the light of this I suggest the following conception of evil, which I shall not defend 
here beyond illustrating its very strong intuitive plausibility. An evil act is one in which the perpetrator acts in a 
way which, through a consideration of their circumstances, motives, intentions, responses and the like, we judge 
to go significantly beyond the pale of mere wrongdoing and so to be worthy of our very strongest moral 
condemnations, and who in so acting wrongfully inflicts life-wrecking or ending harms upon others. 
 
The broadness of this conception of evil allows it to handle the great many different forms that evil can take. As 
I argue in Formosa xix, perpetrators of evil are not a homogenous set – they include everyone from the banal 
nobody Eichmann, to the diabolical Hitler. People perpetrate evil in all sorts of ways and for all sorts of reason, 
and they are affected by and respond to their evil acts in a multiplicity of ways. What binds perpetrators of evil 
together as a group is not only that they wrongfully inflict great harms upon others, but that they do so in ways 
which we judge to deserve our very strongest moral condemnations. We judge them to deserve our very 
strongest moral condemnations on the grounds of a thorough and rounded consideration of: the situation the 
perpetrator acted in; their motives for acting; their intentions; the affect their harming others had on them; and 
their long-term responses to that act of harm. We judge a perpetrator more harshly: if they acted in a situation 
which did not strongly provoke their harmful behaviour; if their motives were particularly sadistic or in some 
other way unusually reprehensible; if they intended harm directly rather than indirectly; if they enjoyed the harm 
they inflicted; or if they failed to acknowledge and offer compensation for their harmful actions.  
 
52 
 
In order to test the intuitive plausibility of this conception of evil, I shall return briefly to the three examples I 
examined above. Hannibal had sadistic motives, enjoyed the harm he directly intended to inflict and felt no 
remorse. In combination with the amount of harm he inflicted, this makes his wrongdoing evil. John’s 
irresponsible behaviour was unusual for him, and brought on by a difficult emotional situation. As such, his 
motives were not unusually reprehensible, he did not directly intend harm, he felt remorse, accepted 
punishment, and offered compensation. For this reason we do not judge John’s acts to be evil, even though they 
were harmful. Mary’s wrongdoing was not provoked by her situation (she was not poor), she enjoyed inflicting 
minor harm on the shop owners, and felt no remorse or guilt. But Mary’s acts, though wrong, inflicted such 
minor amounts of harm that they do not deserve to be judged evil.  
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